Arbitration Only “Upon Mutual Consent”: Kerala High Court Holds Such a Clause Is Not an Arbitration Agreement
Background
In V.K. Varghese v. Anta Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (AR No. 293 of 2026), the Kerala High Court considered whether an arbitrator could be appointed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where the contract provided for arbitration only “upon mutual consent of parties”.
The dispute arose from a Joint Venture Agreement dated 20 August 2016. Alleging non-performance by the Respondents, the Petitioner issued a Section 21 notice on 20 January 2026, invoking Clause 12 and nominating a Senior Advocate as his arbitrator. The Respondents did not reply or nominate an arbitrator within 30 days. The Petitioner contended that the agreed procedure had failed and approached the Court under Section 11(6).
The Respondents argued that Clause 12.2 was not an arbitration agreement under Section 7, as it required mutual consent, and that the claim was time-barred, the notice having been issued nearly seven years after the stipulated completion date.
Issue
Whether Clause 12.2 of the Joint Venture Agreement is an arbitration agreement enabling the Court to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6).
The Court’s Reasoning
The Court began with the wording of Clause 12.2, which reads:
“12.2. All disputes and differences arising between the parties hereto with regards to interpretation or effect this agreement or with regard to the rights and obligations of the parties hereto or under this agreement shall, upon mutual consent of parties, be referred to the arbitration under Indian Arbitration Act and Conciliation Act 1996 or any amendments or re enactments thereof and the venue of arbitration shall be at Cochin. The party raising the dispute shall serve a notice upon the other party advising that a dispute or difference has arisen and nominate in that notice its own arbitrator. The party receiving the notice, shall, within 30 days after receiving such notice, nominate its arbitrator by advising the party raising the dispute and name of the arbitrator appointed by the other party. The arbitrators so appointed shall nominate the third arbitrator. The award of the arbitrators, shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the parties thereto.”
The Court held that the clause has two parts. The first makes mutual consent the condition for referring disputes to arbitration. The second only lays down how arbitrators are appointed. The second part is not independent of the first, as each party must nominate an arbitrator only once the parties have agreed to arbitrate. It was admitted that no such consent existed, so the nomination procedure was never triggered.
The Court relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007), where a clause referring disputes to arbitration “if the parties so determine” was held not to be an arbitration agreement. Such wording requires a further decision by the parties and lacks consensus ad idem to arbitrate. A clause needing fresh consent is only an agreement to agree in future. Applying this, the Court found that Clause 12.2 likewise made the reference depend on the parties’ consent.
The Petitioner relied on Tarun Dhameja v. Sunil Dhameja 2024 and Shubham Equipment v. Rothwell Water 2026. The Court distinguished both. In Tarun Dhameja, the clause stated that disputes “shall be referred to arbitration”, and only the choice of arbitrator was left to mutual consent. In Shubham Equipment, the existence of the arbitration agreements was undisputed.
The Court also followed Nagreeka Indcon Products v. Cargocare Logistics 2026, which held that a clause stating that disputes “can be settled by arbitration” is not an arbitration agreement. It reiterates that consent is the source of the tribunal’s jurisdiction and that the words chosen by the parties best reflect their intent.
Even under the limited inquiry of Section 11(6A), the Court held, it cannot ignore the wording of the clause. As no enforceable arbitration agreement existed, the application was dismissed with no order as to costs. The limitation objection was not decided.
Significance for Practice
The decision shows that the prima facie scrutiny under Section 11(6A) extends to the wording of the clause. Where reference depends on mutual consent, a Section 21 notice and nomination cannot supply the missing agreement.For drafters, a clause stating that disputes “shall be referred to arbitration”, with only the choice of arbitrator left to mutual consent, is safer. A clause making the reference itself subject to consent may fail at the threshold, before merits or limitation are examined. Respondents may defend such applications by showing that fresh consent was a condition of the reference.