Supreme Court Holds That Limitation Does Not Run Against a Litigant When Delay Is Caused by a Tribunal’s Own System Failure
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II v. Ms. Mamta Binani & Ors, 2026 INSC 1003
Background
The appeal arose from the NCLT, Mumbai’s approval, on 15.12.2025, of a resolution plan submitted by Ashdan Properties Private Limited for Rolta India Limited. Aggrieved by that approval, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II sought to appeal before the NCLAT, New Delhi, under Section 61(1) of the IBC.
Section 61(2) prescribes a 30-day limitation period for such appeals, extendable by a further 15 days on sufficient cause with a maximum condonable window of 45 days from the date of the NCLT’s order. That outer limit, in this case, fell on 29.01.2026.
The appellant’s counsel attempted to e-file the appeal on 28.01.2026, but could not do so because of technical defects in the NCLAT’s e-filing portal. A second attempt on 29.01.2026 which was the last day of the condonable period which also failed. The NCLAT Registry informed the appellant that a backend technical defect was under repair. The appeal was finally e-filed the next day, 30.01.2026 which one day beyond the maximum permissible 45-day period.
The NCLAT rejected the application for condonation of delay and dismissed the appeal as time-barred, holding that that it had no power under Section 61(2) to condone delay beyond the 45-day outer limit, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Anil Kohli and Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee. This decision was challenged by the Regional PF Commissioner in the Supreme Court.
The Court’s Reasoning
First, the Supreme Court did not disturb the NCLAT’s statement of the law on Section 61(2) itself, nor did it disagree with National Spot Exchange or Tata Steel. It held, however, that both precedents were factually distinguishable and had been wrongly applied. National Spot Exchange concerned a litigant’s personal hardship, and Tata Steel concerned a party’s own mistaken understanding of limitation law. Neither involved a delay caused by the tribunal’s own system failure. Invoking Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, the Court reiterated that a ratio is tied to the facts that produced it, and “one additional or different fact can make a world of difference.”
Secondly, on the cause of the delay, the Court examined the NCLAT Registry’s own report dated 06.05.2026, which confirmed that the appellant had made bona fide attempts to e-file starting 28.01.2026, and that the failure was attributable to an OTP-delivery/backend glitch in the NCLAT’s own portal and not to any negligence, ignorance, or laches on the appellant’s part.
Thirdly, and most significantly, the Court held that while Section 61(2) genuinely leaves the NCLAT with no discretion to condone delay beyond 45 days, this is not the same as saying the litigant must be left without a remedy when the delay is caused by the tribunal’s own system failure. Drawing on the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit which means an act of the court shall prejudice no one as applied by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , the Court held that limitation runs against a litigant only when the court or tribunal is actually open and capable of receiving the filing. Where the tribunal’s own e-filing system fails to receive a bona fide, timely submission, the correct course is not to “condone” delay but to exempt the period during which the system was non-functional, and treat the date of the first bona fide attempt to e-file as the date of presentation.
Understanding ‘Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit’
As mentioned earlier, ‘Actus curiae neminem gravabit’ means that an act of the court shall prejudice no one”. It is a well-established equitable principle under which a litigant is not made to suffer for a default, delay, or failure attributable to the court or tribunal’s own machinery, rather than to the litigant. In the limitation context, the principle operates not by extending or condoning the statutory period, but by exempting the in accessible period from calculation of limitation period.
Significance for Practice
In an increasingly digitalised judicial system, e-filing has significantly improved the efficiency and accessibility of court proceedings. However, reliance on digital platforms also means that technical failures may, at times, prevent a litigant from completing a filing within the prescribed period. The present judgment provides an important safeguard against such prejudice. The Court rightly applied the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit to ensure that the litigant was not made to suffer on account of a technical failure attributable to the Registry. Importantly, the Court did not extend the statutory period of limitation; rather, it excluded the period during which the Registry was unable to receive the appeal due to the technical failure. The judgment therefore strikes a balance between maintaining the strict limitation regime under the IBC and ensuring that a litigant is not prejudiced by circumstances beyond their control.
